Abstract. We present a threshold secret sharing scheme based on polynomial interpolation and the Diffic-Hellman problem. In this scheme shares can be used for the reconstruction of multiple secrets, shareholders can dynamically join or leave without distributing new shares to the existing shareholders, and shares can bc individually verified during both share distribution and secret recovery.
Introduction
Since Blakley [2] and Shamir [13] introduced the concept of secret sharing in 1979, a number of secret sharing schemes have been proposed with varying properties meeting diverse application requirements. The basic idea of secret sharing is that a dealer distributes partial information (a share) about a secret to each of a set of shareholders such that only authorised subsets of the shareholders can reconstruct the secret. For the purposes of this paper, the main properties of interest here are the following.
9 Perfect security or computational security. A secret sharing scheme is perfectly secure if an unauthorised subset of shareholders can obtain no information about the secret [14] , and it is computationally secure if it is computationally infeasible to determine the secret from such a subset [8, 16] . 9 Verifiable shares. We consider two kinds of share verification. The first is that during share distribution each shareholder can verify his received share to detect a dishonest or failed dealer [3, 10, 11] . The second is that during secret reconstruction a forged share contributed by a cheating shareholder can be detected by the other shareholders [7, 15] . 9 'Online' shareholders. Shareholders can dynamically join or leave the sharing group without having to redistribute new shares secretly to the existing shareholders [1, 4, 12, 13] . 9 Reusable shares. Shares can be reused after the shared secret has been reconstructed, although there may be a modification allowing a predetermined number of multiple secrets to be reconstructed in a specified order [7, 0, 12, 15, 16] .
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This paper presents two variants of a new threshold secret sharing scheme holding the above properties. The mechanism is based on several previously proposed schemes, namely those of Shamir [13], Pedersen [10], Cachin [4] and Pinch [12] . We now briefly summarise the basic features of these schemes.
Shamir [13] proposed a polynomial interpolation based (t, m)-threshold secret sharing scheme, in which no group of fewer than t from a set of m shareholders can obtain any information about a secret, and any group of at least t shareholders can compute the secret. While keeping t fixed, a share can be dynamically added or deleted without affecting the other shares as long as the total number of shareholders remaining is at least t. Deleting a share in this context means that it is made completely inaccessible, even to the owning shareholder. This scheme does not allow the shares to be reused after the secret has been reconstructed.
Pedersen [10] adds a distributed prover to the Shamir scheme, so that the m shares (one for each shareholder) can be verified by the m shareholders.
Cachin [4] presents a protocol with 'online shareholders', in which each of a set of shares is chosen randomly. Adding or deleting a share does not affect the other shares, provided that additional authentic, but not secret, information is posted in a publicly accessible central location. This proposal also does not allow multiple use of the shares.
Pinch [12] gives a modification of Cachin's scheme which allows for an arbitrary number of secrets to be reconstructed without having to redistribute new shares.
Both the Cachin and Pinch protocols are designed for general access structures. The number of authentic messages in a publicly accessible noticeboard is proportional to the number of minimal shareholder sets trusted to recover the secret. If this trusted set number is large, a large noticeboard will be needed. In particular, a (t, m)-threshold scheme is an important special case of a general access structure, where the trusted shareholder sets are all combinations of the m shareholders taken t at a time, of which there are (~), which is of order m t for t small relative to m. Thus, when using the Cachin or the Pinch scheme to implement (t, m)-threshold secret sharing, a potentially large public noticeboard of size (t) must be maintained.
In this paper we modify the Pinch scheme to obtain a threshold secret sharing scheme by using a reusable polynomial function. The main advantage of the new scheme is that a large noticeboard is not required. In addition, this mechanism makes use of publicly accessible provers to give the property of share verification: i.e., each share is verifiable during both share distribution and secret reconstruction.
